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Why we need to talk about money 
Joe Painter 
 
After a succession of apparent victories for the populist right, the British general 
election on 8 June has been hailed as something of a turning point, even perhaps as 
the death knell of neoliberalism and it unlovely offspring, austerity. There was 
certainly much to cheer: the collapse of UKIP, the Conservatives left without a 
parliamentary majority and in increasing disarray, and the popularity of a Labour 
manifesto that sought to break decisively with some of the orthodoxies that have 
dominated political discourse since the Thatcher era. 
 
In at least one respect, however, the official positions of all the principal parties stuck 
to an orthodoxy so embedded that it is taken as an unchallengeable given by 
politicians from across the political spectrum, broadcasters, commentators, 
columnists, think tanks, academics and probably by most voters. This orthodoxy is 
represented by a variety of code words and political clichés. Some are serious-
sounding: ‘we must live within our means’, ‘we will deliver sound public finances’, 
‘balancing the books’, ‘government borrowing must be reduced’. Others are more 
jokey. The recent austerity era has been bookended by two such seeming flippancies. 
The first was the note left after the 2010 General Election by the out-going Labour 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Liam Byrne, for his successor, which read ‘I am 
afraid there is no money’. (Byrne has since said he deeply regrets writing it.) The 
second is the repeated appearance in the 2017 election campaign of the ‘magic money 
tree’, or rather of the idea of its non-existence. Fittingly, this meme reached its zenith 
(or nadir) when, on live TV, prime minister Theresa May patronisingly explained to a 
nurse whose pay had not increased for eight years that ‘there isn’t a magic money tree 
that we can shake that suddenly provides for everything that people want’. With 
hindsight, this moment epitomised the failing Conservative campaign, revealing 
May’s lack of empathy and awkwardness. It also licensed a torrent of satire, with 
magic money trees sprouting all over social media to pay for corporate tax cuts, 
nuclear weapons, high speed rail and repairs to Buckingham Palace. Then, following 
the election, which left May eight seats short of an outright majority, the government 
agreed to one billion pounds of additional public expenditure in Northern Ireland to 
secure the support in parliament of the Democratic Unionist Party. Money might not 
grow on trees, but it appears that it can be found in abundance when political 
circumstances dictate. 
 
And that should not be surprising. As heterodox economists such as Richard Murphy 
and Ann Pettifor point out, governments of sovereign states with their own currencies 
can indeed create money at will - and they do.1 Most obviously, governments print 
banknotes and mint coins, but in wealthy countries notes and coins represent only a 
very small proportion of the money in existence (about 3 per cent in the UK). The 
vast majority of money exists only as stored information: as hand-written or typed 
entries in ledgers and account books in the past and today as digital records on 
computer servers. Moreover, all this money, including the physical notes and coins, is 
debt. Every British banknote carries the phrase ‘I promise to pay the bearer on 
demand’ - in other words the note represents an obligation owed by the issue to the 
holder, that is, a debt. Electronic money is also debt. Every time we buy something 
using a credit card the issuing bank creates new money to finance the transaction. The 
same thing happens whenever an individual or a business takes out a loan. If my bank 
makes a loan to me of £5000 I can immediately spend it - there is £5000 more in the 
economy that did not exist the day before the loan was made. In fact most money is 
created privately by banks, albeit under licence from the government. Given the 
importance of money and the potentially disastrous consequences of poor lending 
decisions, the regulation of private banking is one of the most important functions of 
any government. 
 
As well as licensing private money (debt) creation, the government can create public 
debt with which to finance public expenditure by issuing government bonds. Because 
government bonds are repayable in the currency issued by the Bank of England there 
is no possibility of the government defaulting on the debt, which is thus exceptionally 
secure. Governments can, though, default on debts incurred in currencies which they 
do not themselves issue: the position of the Greek government is thus fundamentally 
different in this respect to that of the British government, since the authority to issue 
Euros is vested in the European Central Bank, rather than the Bank of Greece. The 
central bank can also re-purchase government bonds by issuing new money - the 
process known as quantitative easing (QE). 
 
As all money is debt, any net reduction in debt represents a net reduction in the 
amount of money in circulation. And since the circulation of money is what enables 
much economic activity to take place, generating employment, incomes, profits and 
the taxes on all of them, reducing total debt (public and private) is not the self-
evidently sensible economic strategy that mainstream economists, and most 
politicians, think-tanks and media commentators take it to be. If this seems counter-
intuitive, consider what happens if I win the lottery and use the proceeds to pay off 
my mortgage: both my lottery winnings and my mortgage disappear. The money they 
represented no longer exists and it cannot be used to buy goods and services (which 
would create demand, boost employment and fund tax revenues to pay for public 
services). Granted, I now own the house (a capital asset), which I can live in, but I 
was already living in it before I won the lottery, and I cannot spend the value the asset 
represents unless I re-mortgage (which would put me back to where I was). 
 
To be sure, large swathes of economic activity are not monetised and so do not 
depend directly on the level of debt. Unpaid housework, caring for children and 
people who are disabled, sick or elderly, growing food for our own consumption, 
making things for our own use and mending them when they break or wear out, 
entertaining and educating ourselves and each other, are all activities that contribute 
greatly to human well-being and fulfilment without necessarily involving monetary 
exchange. But while all these activities are important and often necessary, many 
human needs - food, housing, health care and education chief among them - can 
currently be met in full only by spending money, whether publicly or privately. And 
since money is debt, ensuring there is enough money to meet them means ensuring 
there is enough debt.2 
 
This perspective challenges the world-view that underpins almost all media discussion 
of public policy. That world-view takes it for granted that government borrowing is 
undesirable and should be reduced (eventually to zero), that public debt must be 
repaid, and that the government’s ability to spend is therefore largely dependent on 
their ability and willingness to tax (both often assumed to be low). These assumptions 
form part of what Stuart Hall and Alan O’Shea identified as ‘common-sense 
neoliberalism’.3 There are a number of variants of the world-view. The most 
prominent, popularised by Margaret Thatcher, sees the public finances as analogous 
to those of a household or family. As Mr Micawber put it in David Copperfield, 
‘Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen 
[shillings] and six [pence], result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual 
expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.’ In this view, the government 
can spend no more than it can raise in tax. It assumes that the government can run out 
of money and that lax financial management on the part of the government will lead 
to bankruptcy. Both these assumptions are fallacious, though that does not mean that 
poor financial management is a good thing. 
 
The political discourse associated with this world-view invokes a distinctive 
vocabulary and set of metaphors: ‘the nation’s purse strings’, ‘the national piggy 
bank’, ‘taxpayers’ money’ and ‘maxing out the nation’s credit card’ feature 
prominently, alongside the gendered stereotype of the thrifty housewife (supposedly 
personified by Mrs Thatcher) and the figure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as 
Scrooge (or occasionally as Father Christmas when there is an election in the offing). 
Other countries afflicted by neoliberalism have equivalents: think of Angela Merkel’s 
idealisation of the ‘schwäbische Hausfrau’. 
 
An even more strenuously right-wing version of this world-view sees taxation for 
collective provision as inherently undesirable. Thus environment minister Michael 
Gove argues that student fees are justified because: ‘It’s wrong if people who don’t go 
to university find that they have to pay more in taxation to support those who do.’ For 
some on the right, taxation is a form of legalised theft, a view bolstered by the 
widespread and almost entirely unquestioned use of the term ‘taxpayers’ money’, 
rather than alternatives such as ‘citizens’ money’, ‘public money’, ‘government 
money’, ‘the nation’s money’, ‘the community’s money’ and so on. 
 
The discourse of ‘sound public finances’ and ‘balancing the books’ is nowadays just 
as entrenched on the centre left. Here there is at least an acceptance that borrowing for 
long-term infrastructural investment can be legitimate and that balancing the books 
should take place over the course of an economic cycle; and that fiscal policy can 
reduce the volatility of economic activity, as fiscal deficits during economic 
downturns (to support demand) are balanced by surpluses in years of plenty (to 
prevent overheating). Such thinking nevertheless still implicitly treats the public 
finances like those of a household - you run up an overdraft when times are tough, 
and then pay it back when things improve. From a centre-left perspective there is also 
- at least in principle - flexibility about the balance in fiscal policy between taxation, 
borrowing and expenditure. Taxation is not seen as inherently undesirable, but as 
simultaneously a means of macro-economic management (tax cuts stimulate the 
economy, tax rises dampen economic activity down), as a mechanism of 
redistribution, and as the source of funds to finance valued public services. In 
practice, however, the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party and the Liberal 
Democrats have all sought to avoid being portrayed as favouring either general tax 
increases or increased public borrowing. During the election campaign, shadow 
chancellor John McDonnell was at pains to emphasise that Labour’s commitments 
were carefully costed and fully funded (in stark and ironic contrast to the lack of 
costings in the Conservative manifesto). In terms of political tactics McDonnell was 
surely right, given the ubiquity of the household metaphor for public finances and the 
likelihood that media would pounce on anything that could be viewed as financial ill-
discipline. 
 
According to Richard Murphy, a fundamental flaw in all these variations of the 
dominant world-view is that they assume that taxation pays for public expenditure 
(either immediately or by funding future debt repayments). They treat money as a 
scarce commodity, rather than as a socially created and regulated mechanism for 
enabling exchange. Instead, Murphy argues, it is expenditure that allows for taxation, 
not the other way round.4 Governments can create new money at will to finance their 
activities, and doing so will not lead to increased inflation until the economy is 
operating at full capacity (with full employment). Murphy’s case is compelling, but, 
because of the almost universal adoption of the household metaphor, it is counter-
intuitive. If there is to be a decisive break with austerity policies, underpinned as they 
are by the doctrine of balancing the books and the narrative that money is scarce, then 
new narratives and (non-magical) metaphors are urgently required. 
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